We explore the pace of increase in returns to schooling during the transition from planning to market over time across a number of Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and China. We use metadata from 33 studies of 10 transition economies covering a period from 1975 through 2002. Our empirical model is an attempt to account for crosssection and over-time variation in rates of return as a function of the timing, speed, and volatility of reform processes as well as estimation methods used and sample characteristics. Our principal aim is to investigate the relative strength of two hypotheses: (1) the speed of economic transformation from planning to market represent the relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional constraints on wage-setting behavior, leading directly to adjustment returns to schooling to market rates; 2) the rapid increase in returns to schooling during the early reform period reflects the ability of highly-educated individuals to respond to changing opportunities in a disequilibrium situation. We find that both the speed of reforms and the degree of economic disequilibrium as reflected in macroeconomic volatility help to explain cross-country differences in the time paths of the returns to schooling. We report the systematic effects of sample characteristics, estimation methods, and model specifications on estimated returns to schooling.
Introduction
One of the defining characteristics of economies operating under the Soviet, Central and Eastern European, and Chinese planning schemes in the post-World War II era was the imposition of wage "grids," introduced to effect income leveling policies that were, at least officially, favored by the communist government of the Soviet Union and which were adopted in various forms in the Soviet satellites and by China as well. (Meng, 2000; Munich, Terrell, and Svejnar, 2003) . The wage compression imposed by the grids effectively reduced private returns to schooling as conventionally measured.
Estimated returns prior to reform were less than 5% in all countries except Hungary, which operated under a considerably less rigid economic regime than did most of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In China, returns to schooling, which were in the 5-6% range in the early 1950s, fell to nearly zero by the end of the Cultural Revolution (Fleisher and Wang, 2003) .
With economic reforms, enterprises began to operate under fewer constraints, rapidly in most cases, but slower in China and in some of the countries that had been in the Soviet Union sphere of influence. In the absence of the wage-grid structure, it is natural to expect that returns to schooling would increase. While this expectation has to a large extent been fulfilled, the time path of returns to schooling has by no means been uniform. Studies of the returns to schooling in much of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia (CEER) indicate they tended to rise almost immediately following reform, albeit at different speeds. However, most studies of returns to schooling in China in the period covering approximately the first 15 years of its economic transition report low rates of return when compared not only to industrialized and industrializing countries but also to almost all of CEER.
2 This paper seeks an explanation of variation in the growth of returns to schooling within the CEER group as well as the larger variation between CEER and China.
The path of returns to schooling in transition economies has generally evolved in two phases (Sabirianova Peter, 2003) . The early phase encompassed the period in which the transition economies moved from wage setting under the wage grids toward one that reflected the relative marginal products of skilled and unskilled workers. In the second phase the path of relative wages is expected to match more closely the path of relative marginal products of skilled and unskilled (or highly educated and less educated) workers. This paper deals primarily with wage adjustments during the initial, disequilibrium phase of economic transition in CEER and China.
One obvious hypothesis explaining wage adjustments during the first phase is that the speed of relative wage adjustment to the ratio of the marginal products simply reflects the speed of relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional constraints on wage-setting behavior. Thus, the higher the speed of reforms the faster should returns to schooling be adjusted to the market rates. Another hypothesis explaining the relatively rapid increase in returns to schooling in CEER is that the structural transformations, disruptions, and economic disequilibrium are important factors, and the rapid increase in returns to schooling during the first phase reflects the ability of highlyeducated individuals to respond to changing opportunities in a disequilibrium situation (Schultz, 1975) . The two hypotheses -"the speed of reforms" and "disequilibrium" -are not mutually exclusive, and we compare their relative importance with metadata from 33 studies of 10 transition economies, linking these data to a rich set of measures on reform progress and macroeconomic volatility.
Throughout the paper, we define the beginning of reform on the basis of political, legislative, and administrative changes that indicate a departure from the intent to control the economy according to an official plan, allowing or encouraging evolution toward a market economy. These dates are closely associated with the beginning of comprehensive price and trade liberalization programs in CEER and the year following the end of the Cultural Revolution in China.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe metadata on returns to schooling in transition economies. In section 3 we discuss various measures of the speed of reforms and macroeconomic volatility. In section 4
we present an empirical model with which we attempt to account for cross-section and 3 The start of reforms is determined as follows: 1979 for China, 1990 for Hungary and Poland, 1991 for the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, and 1992 for Estonia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
over-time variation in rates of return as a function of reform processes (timing, speed, and volatility), estimation methods used, and sample characteristics. Section 5 reports empirical findings and section 6 provides the summary of results.
Metadata on Returns to Schooling in Transition Economies
In this paper, we use meta-analysis that integrates the results of several studies of the returns to schooling in transition economies. 4 We have created a unique data set of 470 different returns to schooling obtained from 33 studies in 10 transition economies. Besides traditional covariates such as years of schooling and linear and quadratic terms of experience, many earnings functions include additional individual characteristics that might affect the estimated returns to schooling. In our sample, the industry of employment is included as a regressor in 39.8 percent of the estimates.
Firm characteristics, such as size, age, and ownership, are included in 24 percent of the estimates. Having occupational dummies in the earnings functions is less common 4 For a meta-analysis of returns to schooling in a large sample of countries, see Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek (1999) and Denny, Harmon, and Lydon (2002) . Only the latter study includes transition countries, but the estimates of the returns to schooling are not time-varying. 5 The original number of estimates exceeds 500 but for the purpose of our analysis, we had to exclude countries with no time trend in returns to schooling. Among excluded countries are Bulgaria, Macedonia, Vietnam, and countries of Central Asia. We also excluded three outliers: Li and Zhang (1998) we did not find any study in transition economies that explicitly control for ability measures (see Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek, 1999) .
Sample size varies significantly, with the largest samples coming from administrative data and the smallest samples being drawn in the pre-reform period in China and Russia. The samples are mainly based on household surveys, with 7 percent derived from surveys of employers or from administrative data. Roughly half of the estimates are based on combined samples of men and women, with the other half based on gender-specific samples. A fundamental methodological question is the need to define reform progress.
We measure reform progress in four broad dimensions: liberalization of prices and wages, private ownership, enterprise reforms, and the openness of the economy. We 7 The gap in returns to schooling between China and Russia will appear somewhat smaller if we use 1987, the beginning of Gorbachev's gradual economic reforms ("perestroika"), as the start of Russian reforms. 8 The index of wage liberalization is constructed on the base of experts' opinions and documented institutional changes in the labor market. trade, almost completed large-scale privatization, and the significant share of the private sector in GDP. However, the "big bang" reform that describes much of CEER has not characterized China, where the Chinese Communist Party has retained political power throughout the economic transition. The Chinese approach to transition has been aptly described as "growing out of the plan," by Barry Naughton (1995) and by Deng
Xiaoping's phrase, "crossing the river by groping for stones" (Qian and Wu, 2003) .
Several years into the reform era, China not only had a much less liberal price, wage, and foreign trade regimes than did any of the CEER countries, but it also exhibited the smallest increase in the degree of liberalization, except for Slovenia, which had far less rigidly controlled prices to begin with. After five years of reforms, China had hardly begun the privatization process and enterprise reforms. An important illustration of slow enterprise reforms is the persistence of soft budget constraints in state owned enterprises until well into the 1990s, almost 20 years after the end of the Cultural Revolution (Appleton, et al, 2002) .
In contrast to China, all CEER countries in our sample moved very fast in the liberalization of prices, wages, and foreign trade; however, there are significant differences in the speed of privatization and enterprise reforms within the CEER group.
For example, EBRD ranked privatization results in Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine very low compared to other countries in the region. Romania, Russia, and Ukraine still retained soft budget constraints and weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation well into the reform period, whereas others undertook significant actions to harden budget constraints and promote corporate governance effectively.
In contrast to its relatively very slow movement toward free markets, China experienced the most rapid economic growth among the transition economies we examine. Table 5 contains data on real GDP growth and real wage growth over the first five reform years in 10 transition economies. The five-year real GDP growth rates range from a low of approximately -52.8 percent in Ukraine to a high of 47.8 percent in
China. It appears clear that China experienced the largest real GDP growth and real wage growth during the first five transition years, and that real wages declined in all CEER countries except Hungary. Table 5 also illustrates that the loss of macroeconomic control as the fraction of total output produced under Plan diminished was much more severe in CEER than in
China. In China, where the early transition was furthest from the "big bang" approach, inflation was the mildest of all countries represented. In contrast, every CEER country experienced significant inflation during the early reform period. All other measures of macroeconomic volatility (the standard deviations of real GDP growth, real wage growth, and consumer inflation over the early reform period) also indicate less volatility in China than in the other countries, with one exception: the standard deviation of real wage growth was smallest in Hungary.
The variation in the volatility of economic development across countries and between the European-Russian group and China is a strong candidate to explain crosscountry differences in returns to schooling in the early reform period. According to the Shultz hypothesis, the rapid increase in returns to schooling could reflect the ability of highly-educated individuals to exploit opportunities that emerge in periods of disequilibrium. In the transition context, however, testing this hypothesis is complicated by the fact that the period of disequilibrium is coincided with the period of market formation and with the adjustment of schooling returns to market rates. Thus, a major challenge is to disentangle the "speed effect" from the "disequilibrium effect" on the returns to schooling.
A Model of Cross-Country Differences in Returns to Schooling
In this section, we present an empirical model that provides a framework for explaining the cross-country and over-time variation in returns to schooling in terms of differences in the speed of reforms and volatility of economic change. We first specify a baseline equation for the returns to schooling as a function of reform timing, methods of estimation, specifications of the earnings functions, and sample characteristics:
where r it represents the estimates of the returns to schooling for country i and year t; the C's denote the set of country dummy variables, TE it is the early transition period defined as the first five years since the reforms started 9 , TL it is the late transition period, τ it is time trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (τ it =1 at the beginning of reforms), and ε it is an error term with i.i.d. properties and E(ε)=0. Other variables control for the methods of estimation (M it ), the specifications of the estimated earnings functions (P it ), and sample characteristics (S it ).
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The baseline equation enables us to compare trends in returns to schooling between pre-reform, early, and late transition periods; and to identify the extent to which alternative estimation methods, model specifications, and different sample characteristics systematically affect estimates of the returns to schooling. The estimated coefficients of the country dummy variables will reveal if there are ceteris paribus significant cross-country differences in the average returns to schooling. We 
where X it is a vector of variables that reflect countries' progress towards a market economy and Z it is a vector of variables measuring macroeconomic volatility. Since many of these variables (X it and Z it ) are highly correlated with each other, we employ alternative specifications that include at least one measure of reform progress and one measure of macroeconomic volatility. We hypothesize that there is a positive association of the returns to schooling with the progress of economic reform and with economic volatility, ceteris paribus. 
where X i0 is a vector of initial conditions and ∆X i5 is a vector of the speed of reforms variables. Using the same measures of reform progress as in equation (2), we modify them to reflect the speed of reforms, using the difference between the value of market development index in the fifth year of reforms (X i5 ) and the value of market development index in the last year of the old system (X i0 ).
Estimation Results
Both OLS and weighted least square estimates of the baseline regression are reported in Table 6 . There are no principal differences between the two sets of and ownership has no statistically significant effect on the estimated returns to schooling. When earnings data are adjusted for hours worked, estimated returns to schooling are not significantly larger, which is somewhat surprising, given the analysis of Schultz (1988) . Estimates based on all-men samples are somewhat smaller, and those based on all-women samples are somewhat larger, than those in which both genders are represented in the data, which is consistent with studies from the U.S. and other countries (see Dougherty, 2003) .
The largest "effect" on estimated returns to schooling is estimation by non-OLS, mainly instrumental variables techniques, and when the sample is employer based rather than worker based. We take both of these results to imply that measurement and recall errors are important in schooling data, that employer data are more accurate than worker recollection in measuring years of schooling, and that the omission of "ability"
measures from most studies does not dominate other sources of bias in OLS estimation.
The regressions reported in Table 7 represent an attempt to account for the cross-country differences in the rate of return to schooling by adding to the benchmark regression, one at a time, seven alternative measures of the speed of economic reform and seven alternative measures of macroeconomic volatility. The definitions of all these measures are presented in Appendix 2. Our hypotheses are that the level and speed of reforms represent the relaxation of legal, regulatory, and institutional constraints on wage-setting behavior, leading directly to adjustment returns to schooling to market rates, while macroeconomic volatility increases the payoff to schooling in the sense described by Schultz (1975) . Adding the speed of reforms and volatility variables to the benchmark equation is a significant step toward explaining the pattern of rates of return during reform. All coefficients on the speed of reforms and macroeconomic volatility variables are of the expected signs and are statistically significant. When the speed of reforms and volatility variables are added to the baseline regression, the F-statistic for the joint significance of the time variables falls by nearly one-half. Adding the speed of reforms and volatility variables also substantially reduces the F-statistic of the joint country effect. For the baseline regression reported in column (1) of Table 6 , the Fstatistic for significance of the country dummies as a group is 45.77. But in Table 7 it falls to 23.31-37.92 depending on specification.
Another way to assess the explanatory power of the speed of reforms and volatility variables is to use the estimated coefficients to project the impact of a unit change in the value of a regressor on the dependent variable. Given the arbitrary nature of the units of measurement of the regressors, we use one standard deviation as the unit. The estimated coefficient of privatization as measured by the private share of GDP implies that a one standard deviation increase in the private sector share leads to a 0.53 percentage point increase in the return to schooling, cet. par. Using the estimated coefficients reported in column (2) of Table 7 , an increase in the index of wage liberalization by one standard deviation is associated with an 0.45 percentage point increase in the rate of return to schooling, while an increase in mean inflation by one standard deviation is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the return to schooling. Our findings are not conclusive about the relative strength of the two hypotheses. The impact of both reform index and volatility variables on the estimated returns to schooling is significant but their relative power depends on the chosen measure.
A complementary approach to investigate the factors associated with crosscountry differences in return-to-schooling estimates is reported in Table 8 , where we focus on the state of the respective economies at the beginning of reform. Here we drop the country dummies and replace them with the initial levels of the reform variables used in the regressions of Table 7 Table 7 , with the exception of the standard deviation of real GDP growth that switches the sign and becomes statistically insignificant.
Summary
This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of studies of the returns to schooling in several Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and China. The data are the estimation results reported in 33 studies of 10 transition economies. We develop an empirical model which permits us to account for cross-section and over-time variation in rates of return as a function of the timing, speed, and volatility of transition from planning to market as well as estimation methods used and sample characteristics.
We find that both the speed of economic transformation from planning to market and the degree of economic disequilibrium as reflected in macroeconomic volatility help to explain differences in the increase in the rate of return to schooling over time and across countries. Evaluating the relative explanatory power of the speed and disequilibrium hypotheses is complicated by their interaction and the fact that the transition to a market economy necessarily generates disequilibrium. Nevertheless, as the correlations in Appendix Table A3 indicate, measures of transition speed and disequilibrium are by no means perfectly correlated, and we have been able to identify independent effects of these two forces.
The effect of sample characteristics and estimation technique is for the most part consistent with the results of other meta-studies of returns to schooling. It is noteworthy that larger estimated returns to schooling are obtained by non-OLS, mainly instrumental variables techniques and when the sample is employer based rather than worker based.
We take both of these results to imply that measurement and recall errors are important in schooling data, that employer data are more accurate than worker recollection in measuring years of schooling and that the omission of "ability" measures from most studies does not dominate other sources of bias in OLS estimation.
Although the explanatory power of country dummy variables and of trend is significantly reduced when the speed of reforms and volatility variables are incorporated in the regression equations, their regression coefficients remain statistically significant.
Thus, much remains to be learned. We did not explore the role of technological change and the effect of supply shifts on returns to schooling. We also have ignored the role of worker mobility in promoting changes in relative wages. It is likely that these forces act differently in China than in CEER. The answers to these and related questions await further study. (2) Weighted regression -weights are given by the standard error of the estimate of the returns of schooling. TE=early transition period defined as first five years since the start of reforms; TL=late transition period. Time=time trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (Time=1 at the beginning of reforms). b -significant at 5%; c -significant at 10%. The dependent variable is returns to schooling. All specifications include the same set of variables as in Table 6 , including country fixed effects. Changes in returns to schooling show changes in the mean value of returns to schooling in response to one standard deviation increase in the corresponding measure of the speed of reforms and volatility. TE=early transition period defined as first five years since the start of reforms; TL=late transition period. Time=time trend relative to the country-specific reform starting point (Time=1 at the beginning of reforms). Means and standard deviations are calculated over three periods. Notes: N=157 for country-year observations. Means and standard deviations are calculated over three periods.
